Ban Zim diamonds: KP final report

Written by The Zimbabwean

Saturday, 31 October 2009 05:26

In a hard-hitting report, a Kimberley Process (KP) Review Mission that visited Zimbabwe from June 30 to July 4, 2009 accused Zimbabwean authorities of permitting illicit diamond trading and said Harare attempted to mislead the probe team in a bid to conceal involvement of government entities in both extra-judicial violent attacks on illegal panners and diamond smuggling. (Pictured: ZNA chief Philip – Soldiers have contributed to lawlessness at Marange according to report)

(Pictured: A Marange man shows scars from wounds sustained during a severe beating by soldiers)

(Pictured: A Man holds a diamond from the notorious Marange fields)

(Pictured: Men at work, sieving soil at Marange in search for diamonds)

The report to be tabled at a KP meeting that begins in Namibia tomorrow calls for an international ban on Zimbabwe diamonds for six months or until such a time a KP team determines that the country has achieved compliance with the set standards. Excerpts:

Although some aspects of the Zimbabwean system of internal controls and KP compliance do appear to function without concern, the team has identified several areas in which it finds Zimbabwe non-compliant with the minimum requirements of the KPCS.

In addition to the numerous recommendations presented below, the team echoes the findings of a previous KP Review Mission to another participant:
The review mission is mindful of the implications of the findings for both the integrity of the KPCS as well as for Zimbabwe. Clearly, the current state of affairs in [Zimbabwe], in terms of the level of compliance with the KPCS, cannot be allowed to continue.

When a participant fails to fulfill the obligations it has committed itself to and satisfactorily adhere to the minimum requirements for compliance, the objectives of the KPCS are undermined. Urgent corrective action is required if the integrity and effectiveness of the KPCS are to be preserved . . .

Thus, the team believes that these matters should be reviewed as a matter of urgency by the Working Group on Monitoring (WGM) and Participation Committee for necessary action, with respect to individual issues and overall action with respect to the status of Zimbabwe. The team remains prepared to assist with whatever actions the KP or its subsidiary bodies deem necessary.

Although this report has focused almost exclusively on Zimbabwe, the team believes it critical that coordinated action be taken by other KP Participants in the region – particularly South Africa, Namibia, and Botswana – to act against smuggling.

Moreover, these participants boast many best practices and other aspects of their KP compliance systems that Zimbabwe could benefit from understanding and implementing.

For example, the Karas Region in Namibia (Namibia’s diamond producing region) and Northern Western Province in South Africa, jointly collaborate on matters related to illicit diamond trade and share information on a regular basis. This has been a “results-based” system of co-operation, and illicit diamond trade has been rooted out.

Namibia and South Africa still conduct joint operations along their common borders.
Further, the team urges KP participants from outside the region whose nationals have been connected to illicit buying and smuggling – the European Community (Belgium), Israel, Lebanon, and the United Arab Emirates – continue to practice “enhanced vigilance,” as previously recommended by the WGM, and focus more resources on preventing the entry of illicit Marange diamonds into their territories.

If necessary, these Participants should undertake diplomatic outreach to Mozambique to pursue the exchange of law enforcement information that Mozambique may have on the illicit operations underway in its territory.

As set forth in the mandate, the team has developed a number of recommendations for further action, addressed to Zimbabwe and to other entities within the KP, as follows:

(Xhead) Government of Zimbabwe
1. Acknowledgement of non-compliance with KP minimum standards. Voluntary self-suspension from rough diamond trading until KP determines that minimum standards have been met. The team notes that the Government of Zimbabwe has positively addressed the first part of this recommendation in its July 14 response but did not discuss voluntary self-suspension.

2. Development of a workplan, in coordination with KPCS, to provide for improved internal controls throughout KPCS compliance system and, in particular, a sustainable and secure production environment at Marange, in line with KP minimum standards.

The development and implementation of this work-plan should be undertaken with the involvement of domestic industry and civil society, consistent with the tri-partite nature of the KPCS.
The team notes a positive response by the Government of Zimbabwe in its July 14 response to the concepts described in this recommendation but is not aware of further action in this regard.

3. Because of the team’s findings that the presence of ZNA soldiers both participate in illicit diamond trading activities and actually contribute to the general situation of lawlessness in and around Marange, the Government of Zimbabwe should follow-up on its commitment to withdraw military personnel from the area in and around Marange, including Chiadzwa village.

4. Resolution, in accordance with Zimbabwean law, of outstanding ownership disputes and land claims in and around Marange. The local community in Marange area should be formally represented/involved in any decision-making processes regarding future use of the area, including relocation and beneficiation.

a. In conjunction with the claims resolution, an education/awareness campaigns is needed to educate local residents about the negative impact that illicit diamond trade can have on the economy.

Local residents in and around Marange should be encouraged to resist smuggling and preserve diamonds for local development opportunities, as has largely been the case at Murowa, for example.

5. Immediate implementation of enhanced security measures at Marange and the MMCZ complex.

a. Construction of the fencing around Marange must be completed, and all areas where the fence can be penetrated must be mended. The plan developed by the ZRP for the necessary fencing and equipment measures should be reviewed carefully and implemented, to the extent possible.

b. A more detailed profile system must be introduced in order to prevent suspected illicit diamond traders from entering the diamond areas or from being employed in any diamond mine.

c. At Marange, employees sort diamonds with safety gloves. When Diamonds are manually-sorted, tweezers should be used to pick up the diamonds and scrapers to shift or separate gravel, rather than by bare hands or with safety gloves. Diamond sorters should also not wear long boots.

d. Diamonds at Marange are sorted under an open shade, and one can see the diamond box from a distance. This is a security risk. The sorting area must be sealed off. A diamond register must be introduced where diamonds are sorted, so that the contents of the box may be recorded before it is taken elsewhere. There must be access control into recovery and only authorized persons must enter the recovery. There must be only one single entry point.

e. Method of diamond sorting at Marange is very outdated. There is a possibility that only 60-70% of diamonds are retrieved. There is a need to control access to tailings as they still contain a lot of diamonds.

f. The security officials at Marange observe the sorting of diamonds but appear to be absent when the diamonds are counted and weighed in. Security officials on site must have clear job descriptions. There do not appear to be specific tailings, gravel, or sorting handling procedures.

g. The Government of Zimbabwe should ensure that any efforts to increase security in and around Marange are carried out in a manner that respects human rights and does not contribute to further smuggling.

h. Once the proper systems are in place at Marange, Zimbabwe may consider development of a well-trained Diamond Detective Branch (undercover agency, similar to one in Namibia and South Africa) to vigorously deal with the illicit diamond trade at Mutare and other border areas. The branch must share information with neighboring states and collaborate in obtaining full information on particular suspects and networks.

6. Study ways to improve recording and quantification of illegal trade in diamonds, i.e. distinguish foreign nationals in the police seizures database.

7. Provision of a full assessment of the total unsold production in order to reconcile production, stockpile, and exports. This must include diamonds subject to judicial process, which the Team was not able to review.

8. Ensure that necessary manual changes to the HTS classification error on pre-printed KPCs are made consistently.

9. As recommended in the 2007 RV report, consideration by the Government of Zimbabwe of revising the current KP compliance structure to create a simplified process that reduces the number of actors involved in the import and export processes.

a. Given the particular needs demanded by the KP, Zimbabwe may consider removing production and administration of diamonds from the MMCZ and ZMDC and instead develop an entirely separate diamond office.

10. Review of previous submissions to the KP concerning Marange for possible revision.

11. Presentation to the KP of relevant information concerning the actions taken against Newman Chiadzwa, as well as a renewed commitment to refrain from retaliation against Newman Chiadzwa or any other individuals with whom the Review team met.

12. Consideration of the appointment of a special rapporteur or other appropriate mechanism to further document the human rights concerns and violence at Marange. The Team notes a positive response by the Government of Zimbabwe in its July 14 response to this concept.

a. Competent authorities should institute an investigation that will further look into the issue of violence against civilian populations emerging from the operations in Marange.

b. The KP Chair should contact the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and provide a summary of the findings of this report, as well as summaries of interviews/photographic evidence.

c. As stated above, the Government of Zimbabwe should ensure that any efforts to increase security in and around Marange are carried out in a manner that respects human rights and does not contribute to further smuggling.

Kimberley Process/Working Groups/WDC

13. In light of Zimbabwe’s non-compliance with the minimum requirements, the Participation Committee should consider the full range of options set forth in the Interim Measures Guidelines, including suspension of Zimbabwe for a period of at least six months, or until such time as a KP team determines that minimum requirements have been met. If Zimbabwe opts to self-suspend, then the KP should undertake the necessary processes to implement the self-suspension.

14. Facilitation by the KP of the appointment of an independent monitor to assist with the implementation of the work-plan for Marange and overall Zimbabwean KP compliance system. The monitor would assist in the coordination of the request and receipt of technical assistance and support through the KPCS and its participants and observers.

15. Facilitation by the KP of the provision of technical and other assistance, e.g. security cameras, fencing, and other measures, during which time the Government of Zimbabwe implements, as part of its work-plan, a security program that excludes the ZNA, and to the fullest extent possible, the ZRP from responsibilities in and around Marange.

16. Creation of a Regional Task Force, with a structure consistent with the tripartite nature of the KPCS, to provide an on-going mechanism for oversight of the independent monitor, provision of technical assistance, information sharing, and other coordination efforts throughout the region.
The Task Force could work directly in conjunction with the independent monitor, or as a mechanism within the KP (e.g., initiative of the KP Chair).

17. Review by WGS of 2009 statistics from the DRC and other regional diamond producing Participants, as well as the EU, UAE, India, Israel, and Lebanon to determine if illicit Marange diamonds have entered the legitimate trade.

18. Development by the WGM of additional measures for “enhanced vigilance” by all KP Participants to ensure that illicit Marange diamonds do not enter legitimate trade. Participants whose nationals have been implicated in the smuggling of Marange diamonds should investigate these claims further and provide detailed results to the WGM.

19. Expedited review and consideration of the revised proposal concerning the provision and administration of security in diamond mining areas.

20. Outreach by the KP and individual participants, as appropriate, to encourage Mozambique to improve border control and consider joining the KP as a means to combat smuggling efforts.

21. The WDC should work with MMCZ to ensure full compliance with and implementation of the System of Warranties.

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